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 rate of loans and discounts has been kept at less than two per cent. In
 1893 it was without exception 1 55 per cent. When some co-operative
 bank has raised its rate of discount too high, as in the case of that at
 Belpasso, where it once got to ten per cent., this brought down on it
 the swift and public reproof of Professor Luzzatti, who declared he
 could no longer consider it as a co-operative bank.
 Thus the people's banks, by greatly facilitating the operations of
 the country's credit-market, without abusing that credit or falling
 short in their range of activity, have increased their net profits froin
 4,250,000 francs in 1880 to 6,514,000 in 1893. Of the latter amount
 4,827,854 francs were distributed to the members of the 493 banks in
 dividends. The remainder was thus divided :-Ordinary reserve,
 763,243 francs; extraordinary reserve, 393,512 francs; sum at the
 disposal of' the Administrative Council bestowed in great part on
 benevolent and provident undertakings, 211,256 francs; specially dis-
 tributed among employees, 379,738 francs; benefit, 107,529 francs;
 ready cash, 113,723 francs.
 Nevertheless this wonderful record must not cause us to share the
 illusions of J. S. Mill. He believed in the advent of industrial peace
 as soon as working men should partake in the- profits of capital and in
 management. Many still fall into this error, and we have witnessed
 Mr. Price lately inveighing against co-operation, because it had failed
 to realise all expectations.
 The truth is that co-operation is a social institution which, when
 worked with care and on sane principles, can materially assist the
 working man and all other step-children of fortune who wish to
 ameliorate their position. Co-operation is not a socialistic, much less
 an ecclesiastical, institution; from these bodies hostilities have assailed
 her, and against them I for my part have had to fight. At her last
 congress, at Bologna, there were yet echoes of that fight, but they were
 echoes of victory and triumph. She, strengthened by struggle, goes
 her way, and goes forward, bearing aid to the worker so long as she
 remains free and individualist.
 GIUSEPPE FIAMINGO
 THE GERMAN INSURANCE LAWS.1
 IT is well known that even before the repressive legislation of 1878
 the German Government were anxious to find some means of manifesting
 their practical interest in the welfare of the working classes. Such a
 counterblast to Socialist agitation became perhaps even more necessary
 when that agitationl had been suppressed but not silenced. Dr.
 1 For much that is contained in this paper I am indebted to the Repqrt on the
 Labour Question in Germany drawn up by the Secretary to the Royal Commission
 on Labour, and to the original material from which that report is derived.
This content downloaded from 104.239.165.217 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 13:54:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 284 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 Schafhle has saicl that, though the law ' against the generally dangerous
 efforts of Social Democracy' proved effective in putting an end to
 the terrorist attitude of the party before 1878, it rather strengthened
 than weakened the clisposition of the working classes to believe in the
 desirability of replacing the existing order by the anticipated glories
 of the Socialist State. It is not surprising, therefore, that 1881 shoulcl
 have seen not only Prince Bismarck's attempt to create an innocent
 form of organisation by reviving the old guilcls of hanclieraftsmen, but
 also a definite proposal to cleal with the question of insurance. Still
 it is always possible to exaggerate the importance of this motive.
 After all, the legislation proposed in 1881 was but one step further on
 that path which the Imperial Government had already been treacling.
 From the rniddle of the century onwards there hacl been a clecided
 tendency on the part of Prussia to supplement the voluntary system
 by compulsion, but as long as there appeared to be any hope of
 achieving the desired result by means of private associations or local
 methods the Imperial Government appears to have been reluctant to
 put forward any uniform scheme. Voluntary funds of some kind or
 other had existed ever since the mediaeval guilds framed regulations
 for the assistance of members incapacitated from supporting them-
 selves. Miners had had their special funds from the 13th century
 onwards, voluntary up to 1854 and afterwards compulsory. The
 Prussian Industrial Code of 1845 attempted to compensate for the
 abolition of compulsory guilds by emiipowering communes to compel
 employers to organise insurance funds and workmen to subscribe to
 them. With the rapid development of labour organisations in the
 sixties there arose naturally a desire for a standard law, which, whilst
 recognising the unions' funds, should not interfere directly with their
 muanagement. Consequently the Industrial Code-of 1869 was content
 to uphold the local and compulsory regulations, which had grown up
 by degrees in the various States, but to exempt all workmen from
 their operation who could be shown to subscribe to a voluntary fund.
 Difficulties arose subsequently as to whether such exemption could be
 claimed by subscribers to any fund, or whether the rules of the fund
 must be such as could be approved by the State. The result was the
 law of 1876, exempting only those who subscribed to an authorised or
 registered fund.
 Still it was found that in practice very few communes availed them-
 selves of their right to form compulsory funds, and that a large number
 of voluntary funds omitted to seek registration. Hence a strong feel-
 ing amongst the supporters of workmen's insurance that the existing
 law was both anomalous and inadequate. Local variations, unimpor-
 tant at a time when there was little migration from one locality or
 from one industry to another, became a hardship in a period of frequent
 changes. Moreover, the actual dissolution of many Socialist organisa-
 tions after 1878 and the dispersal of their funds made an appreciable
 difference in the necessity for increasing, the number of compulsory
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 funds. Add to this that the law of employers' liability was in urgelnt
 need of amendment, and it is clear that a multiplicity of causes prompted
 the Imperial message announcing that ' the healing of social ills cannot
 be effected entirely by repressing the excesses of the Social Democrats,
 but must be equally sought by positive endeavour to promote the wel-
 fare of the working classes.'
 Accordingly in 1881 a Bill was introduced to amend the law
 regarding employers' liability. Its provisions gave rise to considerable
 difference of opinion, and since the limits of an employer's liability
 could not be defined without revising the whole question of aid
 afforded to workmen during incapacity to work it appeared best to
 proceed first with insurance against sickness. Thus it happened that
 the Sick Insurance Law of June 15th, 1883, preceded that on accident
 insurance by the space of one year.
 By these laws, already familiar to readers of the ECONOMIC
 JOURNAL, provision had been made for sickness more or less temporary,
 an.d for disability, whether partial or total, resulting froin injury
 incurred in the course of employment. For the disability which
 colmies in the course of nature, and for permiianent invalidity, the third
 and most important of the Insurance Laws has made, at any rate, a
 partial provision. I say 'partial' because amongst the many criticisms
 levelled at the German pension scheme nolne is more common, and
 perhaps few are better founded, than that of the inadequacy of the
 relief afforded. After prolonged discussion the Invalidity and Old
 Age Insurance Law was passed in May, 1889, and received the Imperial
 sanction in June of the same year. It was not, however, until April lst,
 1891, that it came into force, so that it has not yet been in operation
 for as much as five years, too short a time to entitle us to do
 more than suggest certain tendencies which its working seems to
 foreshadow. Its scope is greater than that of the previous laws, since
 with very few exceptions it makes insurance obligatory upon all
 persons over sixteen years of age and engaged in any industrial pursuit
 for which they receive wages not exceeding ?100. The exceptions
 have led to some uncertainty in detail, but the general intention of
 the framers of the law appears to have been the inclusion of all
 persons directly dependent for their subsistence upon employment by
 others; for small employers or independent workmen insurance is
 optional, not compulsory. Apparently, too, the type of work in the
 minds of the legislators was the work of a mechanic, since certain
 occupations involving mental labour of a higher kind are especially
 exelmlpted. This is probably the reason, to take only one instance, why
 nurses must insure themselves and governesses go free. A desire to
 avoid over-centralisation prompted the adoption of a local system
 whereby district insurance institutes (Versicherutngsanstalten) were
 established thr-oughout the empire, governed by a board composed
 partly of salaried officials, partly of representatives from the employers
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 and employed. Except that the workmen receive compensation for
 loss of wages incurred through attendance, these representatives are
 unpaid. Vertrauensrzndnner or local agents may be appointed for
 carrying out the business of the committee, and a State Commissioner
 appointed by the Goverinment watches over the doings of the local
 people, whether agents or committee members, lest the interests of the
 Government or of other insurance institutes should be in any way
 imperilled. Finally, every district must have its court of arbitration
 composed of an equal number of assessors from employers and
 employed, and presided over by a Government official.
 Persons insureed are entitled to an allowance in case of permanent
 invalidity or after they have attained the age of seventy; if not already
 subject to the sick insurance law, they may also be afforded such
 medical care as may prevent the necessity of having to grant them an
 invalid pension. A subscriber refusing to submit to such precautionary
 measures forfeits his claim. To obtain an invalid allowance it is
 necessary to have been a subscriber for at least five years of forty-
 seven weeks each, the margin of five weeks being left to allow for
 warnt of employment and similar contingencies. For an old age
 pension the minimum term is thirty contributory years, but in neither
 case is the subscriber at liberty to cease his payments at the end of
 that term. On the contrary, if still able to work, a workman in
 receipt of an old age pension must continue to pay the premiums
 required from any other workman receiving equal earnings. Seventy
 years is the minimum age at which such pensions are granted, but an
 invalid pension may be given at any age, provided that the institute
 is satisfied both that the disability is genuine and that it extends to
 other kinds of work besides the special trade formerly followed by the
 invalid. It has been further defined as inability to earn one-third
 of the wages of the class to which the workman has belonged for the
 last five years. Incidentally, I may say that the comparatively small
 proportion of pensions granted to invalids is ascribed by the Socialist
 deputies to the Reichstag to the difficulty necessarily involved in
 proving a negative.
 As forty-seven' weeks constitute a contributory year, the time
 required for qualification may be materially shortened by counting
 these periods consecutively. An invalid pension can then be earned in
 just over four years and a half, and an old age pension in twenty-seven
 years and six weeks. Payments may, however, be to a certain extent
 intermittent without disqualifying the insured person. Intervals due
 to military service or illness for which the patient is not himself
 responsible are not counted against him, but any other cessation of
 payments either defers the period of qualification, or, if extending to
 four years, obliges the subscriber to compensate for the time lost
 ,by five years' contribution in place of four. Illness due to accident
 furnishes no ground for claiming an invalid pension if the sufferer is
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 already receiving an allowance under the Accident Insurance Law.
 Invalid pensions may also be at any time withdrawn if a change
 occurs in the sufferer's condition which enables him to work.
 The amount of the pension payable varies with the premiums paid,
 and these again vary with the wages received. For insurance pur-
 poses all German workmen are divided into four wage classes, and the
 subjoined table shows the premium payable every week by the
 workmen in each class, as well as the proportion paid out towards each
 pension and the total weekly allowance in sickness or old age. The
 premiums have been fixed for ten years and at the end of that time
 will be subject to revision, but it is not anticipated that even at the
 end of eighty years the maximum payments will exceed 2'd. in
 Class I., 4d. in Class II., 6d. in Class III., and 73d. in Class IV. Half
 these premiums are paid by the employer, and half by the employed;
 the workmen's share, which is alone- given in the table, is deducted
 from their wages as in the case of sick insurance. The State con-
 tributes fifty marks to every pension, and the insurance institutes
 sixty marks to every invalid pension, besides a weekly proportion
 of the premiums paid; to old age pensions the institutes contribute
 this weekly proportion only. For an invalid pension all premiums
 paid are. taken into consideration, for an old age pension only those
 1410 weeks in which the highest premiums have been paid.
 Proportion Received Weekly Pensioni Payable. Back.
 Wage Weekly Premilum_ In Invalidity.
 Class. Wage. Payable. In Invalid In Old Age IIn Old
 Pension. Pensioli. After 5 After 50 Age.
 years' Con- years' Con-
 tribution. tribution.
 s. d. d. d. d. s. d. s. d. s. d.
 4 X 2 2 3 0 2 0'
 II. 9 1 4 4 2 4 4 9` 2 7
 III. 13 92 lw 1 1 2 6* 6 2 3 1l
 IV. 18 4* a __ 1 2 8 7 113 3 8
 As a matter of fact, any individual pension will be almost certain
 to fall somewhere between the different classes, since the wages of the
 workman have probably not remained stationary, but ?5 6s. 5d. and
 09 lls. represent the extreme limits of the annual allowance in old
 age, ?5 14s. 83d. and ?20 15s. 6d. the lowest and highest invalid
 pension. This the framers of the law do not regard as representing a
 competence; ' it was never the intention of the Act to provide aged and
 invalid persons with a sufficient income for independent livelihood, but
 simply to aid them by an augmentation to any other provision
 or assistance they might possess or be able to secure.' Consequently
 the law does not in any way obviate the necessity for some public
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 provision for the needy, even if after a longer trial it prove to diminish
 the burden laid upon the poor-law.
 The machinery by which the scheme is worked presents some prac-
 tical difficulties. Contributions are paid by means of stamps of a
 special kind affixed by the employer- to a receipt card divided into
 forty-seven spaces, one for each week of the contributory year. These
 cards bear the day and year of issue and are numbered in regular suc-
 cession. When full they are returned to the insurance institute by
 which they were issued, and should the insured person change his resi-
 dence frequently, all these cards would have to be collected from the
 different institutes when the time came for substantiating his claim.
 As each card bears a reference to the previous one it is possible
 to trace the history of any individual, and to determine the proportion
 due towards his pension from each institute. When the claim
 has been substantiated the district post-office is notified of the
 fact and advances the allowance in specified instalments, recover-
 ing the amount at the end of the year from the insurance institutes.
 The system of cards has not been without its prejudicial effect upon
 the reception accorded to the law. Though severe penalties are
 enacted against employers or other persons convicted of putting special
 and private marks upon a card with a view to conveying information
 about the person insured, there is still a lurking suspicion in the minds
 of some amongst the workmen that it will be easy for employers to
 consult a sort of official black list compiled in this way at the insurance
 offices.
 It remains to consider what are called the ' transitory provisions'
 of the law, and the stipulations with regard to the reserve fund. The
 two are closely connected, for the whole system presupposes that,
 though a period will arrive when a balance can be struck between the
 number of allowances and the capital accumulated to meet them, the
 benefits of the law are, in the meantime, to be extended to all persons
 already qualified by age or infirmity for the assistance which their
 successors will earn by the payment of premiums. Obviously this
 immediate benefit to be conferred upon an indefinite number of
 persons introduces a grave element of uncertainty into the calcula-
 tions, which is to be met partly by frequent readjustments of the
 reserve fund, partly by the State subsidy, already mentioned, of fifty
 marks to every invalid penision. It was decreed that persons becoming
 invalidls within the frst five, or septuagenarians within the first thirty,
 years after the Act came into force were to be treated as having paid
 the proper contributions, provided that they had been employed in a
 trade or business included under the Act. This employment must
 have continued five years before invalidity to qualify the person for an
 invalid pension, and three years before the passing -of the law to qualify
 him for an old age pension. Wage-class I. is the basis for reckoning
 the average rate of wages during the time by which the probationary
 period is shortened in the case of invalid pensions, whilst for old age
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 pensions the actual rate of wages is taken into consideration. In
 order to substantiate a claim under the transitory provisions the
 applicant must provide himself with certificates showing the duration
 of all employments since 1886, the duration of the interruptions, if any,
 and the causes of them, the rate of wages since 1888, the duration of
 every illness entailing incapacity to work, and the duration of all
 military or naval service after January Ist, 1886. Persons claiming
 invalid pensions must also prove that they have paid the necessary
 premiums for the space of one year. To tide over the period during
 which this uncertain number of allowances will become due the State
 pays a sum to be devoted, as already specified, to subsidising invalid
 pensions, amounting to ?320,000 in the first year, and gradually rising
 to ?3,450,000 in the 80th year. After that it is estimated that this
 subsidy may gradually be extinguished, and that the whole burden of
 the allowances, then expected to reach ?12,520,000, can be borne by
 employers and employed. The law intends the scheme to be ulti-
 mately self-supporting, though -at present it is by no means clear, in
 view of increasing costs of administration, that this desirable result
 will be attained.
 Meanwhile the reserve fund is to be so fixed for the first ten years
 that at their close it will be equal to one-fifth of the estimated capital
 needful to supply the payment of the probable allowances falling due
 during that term. Any deficiency dnring this first contributory period
 must be met during the next, which is fixed at five years, and so on
 until the 80th year, due allowance being made for the augmentation
 obtained by the addition of interest to capital. Interest has been
 reckoned at 31 per cent., but it has been suggested that the large
 amount of capital to be invested will possibly force up the price
 of securities and proportionately lower the interest obtainable.
 It is exceedingly difficult to draw up any comparative statistical
 table worthy of the name. Even the official returns issued by the
 Imperial In-surance Office (so far as I have been able to get them) seem
 little but a wilderness of figures from which it is difficult to draw any
 very illuminating conclusions. As to the guide to the system drawn
 up by that office for the Chicago Exhibition, I can only say that
 it completely succeeds in darkening counsel by words without know-
 ledge, as it presents the astonished reader with some amazing percent-
 ages and no sort of explanation as to the method of obtaining them. That,
 whilst the percentage of pensioners per 100 persons insured increases
 from 1 20 in the first year to 12 60 in the fiftieth, the cost of management
 should remain stationary looks more like a pious opinion than a well-
 grounded expectation, more especially since the increase is anticipated
 almost entirely amongst claims for invalid pensions, which are infinitely
 the most troublesome and therefore the most expensive to establish.
 It already appears that the proportion of costs to premiums, which in
 1891 was about 4418 per cent., in 1893 had become 5-21 per cent. This
 increase, however, is apparently smnaller than that in the number of
 No. 22.-voL. VI U
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 pensioners. It also appears froni the official statistics that the propor-
 tion of claims for invalid pensions, which after due investigation are
 found to be substantiated, is considerably smaller than in the case of old
 age pensions. Up to the Ist of October, 1894, the total number of old
 age pensions claimed was 294,248; of these 79-29 per cent. were
 granted, whilst the percentage in the case of invalid pensions was
 69 04, or ten less than in the former case. The statistics up to April
 1st, 1895, show that the same proportion had been fairly maintained,
 the percentage of claims allowed being respectively 79-52 and 69-99.
 But it would be impossible to go into every detail connected with
 so elaborate a scheme. I would merely suggest some few points which
 are perhaps worthy of consideration.
 1. It has been said, and with some show of justice, that the actuarial
 basis of the scheme is open to suspicion. All calculations made as to
 the probable amount of invalidity and the probable mortality before
 the age of seventy are based upon Behm's tables relating to railway
 workers, compared, where possible, with the confessedly defective
 invalidity statistics for different occupations included in the census of
 occupations of 1882. It is doubtful whether statistics drawn so largely
 from one industry, and that an industry as peculiarly situated as rail-
 way work, will be confirmed by experience. Further, the results
 obtained for men have been applied to women, though the authors of the
 memorandum upon which the law is based admit this procedure to be
 a mere assumption. In any case the degree of invalidity must of
 necessity be very difficult to forecast, and yet the conditions must be
 assessed in advance so as to cover allowances and expenses of every
 kind. Further, even if the contributions can so far be satisfactorily
 adjusted, their regularity is liable to disturbance by sickness, military
 service, and lack of employment. Perhaps the first two of these dis-
 turbing elements may admit of calculation beforehand (though what is
 to be said in the case of war ?); it is hardly possible to forecast with
 any certainty the number of the unemployed.
 2. From all sides come complaints of the unnecessary complications
 arising from the threefold scheme and-the expense involved in constant
 negotiations between the different authorities, especially between the
 Sick Insurance and Old Age and Invalidity Insurance Institutes.
 Employers in the country districts declare that the burden is greater
 than agriculture can bear, and authorities as eminent as Dr. Freund,
 the chairman of the Berlin Court of Arbitration for Invalid Insurance,
 and Dr. Bddiker, head of the Imperial Insurance Office, are demanding
 simplification and reform. Indeed, it seems clear that if something is
 not soon done in this direction by the Legislature, its hand will be forced
 by the practical administrators. Only in November last an important
 conference was held at Berlin at which Dr. Bddiker advocated the
 amalgamation of accident and old age insurance on the ground that
 both were-concerned with the granting of pensions andimight therefore
 be worked by a single authority. Dr. Freund, on the other hand,
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 -wished to combine sick and invalid insurance, and both alike were in
 favour of abolishing the cumbrous, laborious, and expensive system of
 cards and stamps. Attempts are being mnade on all sides tc bring about
 a practical amalgamation, either by organising a common system of
 medical aid for invalids having claims either upon sick or upon invalid
 allowances, or by combining the courts of arbitration attached to the
 -different kinds of insurance, or- by working in concert with the poor-
 law authorities. Again, it is often asked that the system should be made
 more simple by being made more far-reaching. Only, say the malcon-
 -tents, make every German citizen of either sex whose income is below
 the stated level of 2,000 marks be obliged to contribute so much weekly
 into a common fund which will insure him against sickness, accident, or
 old age, and we can then entrust the working of the whole to the
 communal authorities already chargeci with the administration of
 the poor-law. They will be in possession of all necessary informa-
 tion, and the increased burden thrown upon the tax-payers by making
 them responsible for accident insurance will be counterbalanced by the
 relief which will be afforded to the poor-rates. In fact, lessen oppor-
 tunities for dispute by making the obligation uniform and universal.
 3. There is no doubt that as the law stands at present the oppor-
 -tunities for litigation are almost infinite. As Mr. Spender has well
 put it, the individual insurer ' may appeal in the first instance against
 -inclusion under the Act at all, and if he loses the case in a lower court
 he may take it to a higher. He may protest against the calculations
 made from time to time on his insurance cards, and here also he has a
 right of appeal. Or if his claim to an allowance either for old age or
 -infirmity is rejected by the institute he may take his case to the
 Arbitration Court, and once again both parties have a legal right of
 revision in respect of the court's decision. Disputes may arise, not
 ,only between individuals and the insurance institutes, but between the
 institutes and the sick or accident insurance societies provided by
 previous legislation, and these also entail litigation. Or, finally, there
 may be conflicts between the insurance institutes and the poor-law
 -authorities.' And as an incidental proof that these opportunities for
 litigation are not merely theoretical, it may be mentioned that during the
 years 1892 to 1894 statistics show appeals against the decision of the
 Arbitration Courts to have been made by the insured persons with
 increasing frequency though diminishing success.
 The total number of appeals was
 Succeededl.
 Insured. Institutes. Insured. Institutes.
 1892 3571 568 43/ 2 0 28-9 62 1
 1893 3194 67-8 ?/o 32 2 ? 21'5 61 4
 1894 2923 70-4 / 296 ?/ 196 648
 J~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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 Of these appeals eight out of every thirteen, or nearly two-thirds,
 concerned invalid allowances.
 4. Besides litigation there are other practical administrative diffi-
 culties. Many districts find it impossible to procure the necessary
 staff. Employers complain of the strain upon their clerical staff occa-
 sioned by the system of stamping, and in the eastern provinces, where
 the duties connected with the issuing and booking up of the cards fall
 upon persons holding honorary appointments, the dissatisfaction is so
 great that the substitutiQn of salaried officials is anticipated. In view
 of such an increase in the already sufficiently numerous bureaucracy it
 -seems a little difficult to credit predictions of diminishing cost of
 management. A good deal has been said, too, about an observed increase
 of malingering, which is scarcely likely to admit of any relaxation of
 official surveillance. Actual storage room for the cards constitutes
 another practical difficulty; in Berlin it has already been found
 necessary both to construct a special building and to enlarge it.
 5. Criticisms of this kind are however less serious, because more
 definite and easier to meet, than the vaguer statements mnade so
 frequently in the German press, and especially the labour press, as to
 the effect which the insurance laws have exercised upon wages and
 profits. In the first place there is considerable difference of opinion
 as to the class which really bears the burden of insurance. According
 to the official figures the difference between the sums paid by the
 employers and employed respectively under the threefold law is in
 itself inconsiderable, but there is some reason to suppose that the
 figures given represent rather each party's legal share in the total
 contribution than what each party actually contributes. A firm
 of manufacturers in Stuttgart stated to the factory inspector that they
 paid the whole of the contribution due from their workpeople, since-
 the deduction of any part of it so embittered the workmen against the
 State provision and made them so little sensible of its benefits. On the
 other hand, the Social Democrats contend that the whole cost falls upon
 the workmen, since, besides their own contributions, they bear the burden
 of the increased taxation upon commodities necessary to furnish the
 imperial subsidy, whilst the employers indemnify themselves for their
 enforced contribution by reducing wages or raising the price of the
 goods they produce. Consequently many Social Democrats regard the
 Insurance Law as an unsatisfactory substitute for the poor law, which
 derived its funds to a greater extent from the upper and middle classes
 and which provided larger allowances. Certainly the reports of
 the factory inspectors afford some justification for the complaint
 that wages are, in some cases, reduced after the grant of an old age
 pension, but it seems only fair to suppose that diminishing ability to
 work may have something to do with this. On the whole there appears
 to be some reason for thinking that the prejudice, with which the law
 was undoubtedly received at first, is diminishing, and that the demand
 is now rather for reform than. repeal.
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 6. With regard to the influence of the new legislation upon the
 cost of poor law administration the evidence is again conflicting. A
 very recent report issued by the Frankfort poor law administrators
 states that there has been a considerable decrease in outdoor relief,
 but at the same time -an increase in indoor and especially medical
 relief. This they attribute to the habit fostered by the insurance
 legislation of speedy recourse to hospital treatment, and to the fact
 that illness is most frequent during periods of slack work or no work
 at all, when, owing to the lapse of contributions, the sufferers are not
 entitled to help from sick insurance funds. In Leipzig it is said that
 the expense involved in sifting out cases for which the insurance funds
 are really responsible has increased the cost of poor law administra-
 tion by 2 per cent. Probably it is still too soon to judge of the extent
 to which the actual number of persons coming upon the rates will be
 diminished owing to insurance. It is clear that the scheme will
 hardly touch the casual labourer, the unemployed, the vicious or dis-
 solute, who constitute the main body of poverty with which poor law
 administrators have to deal. The poor law we must always have
 with us, even in Germany. It would be unreasonable, as Mr. Graham
 Brooks has said in his Report to the American Department of
 Labour, to look for miarked results as yet in this direction. It is
 something if, as he also pcints out, the first effect of the new law is a
 more enlightened care for the sick and injured. Here certainly much
 is being done, since a speedy and complete recovery is in the interests
 of employers and of insurance institutes alike. Hence the services of
 the best surgeons and physicians are gladly retained, hospitals are
 multiplying, and in many parts convalescent, homes and special
 establishments for the cure of consumptive patients have been erected.
 Again, in estimating the beneficial results of the laws we must not
 overlook the facilities afforded for obtaining statistical information.
 Last, but not least, is to be placed the sense of security which is
 afforded by at least some provision for old age, however inadequate
 that provision must appear to English eyes.
 That the provision is too small and the age at which it is attainable
 too long deferred seenms to me almost beyond question. It is equally
 certain that the system is unnecessarily cumbrous, and probably,
 therefore, unnecessarily expensive. Nor can there be any doubt that,
 so far, the attitude towards the scheme both of employers and
 employed has been decidedly mistrustful. All this, however, points, as
 I have said already, rather to the necessity of reform in detail than to
 the desirability of repeal, even if such a retrograde step were really
 possible. It was loudly advocated at first both by social democracy
 and by reactionary conservatism. But it must be remembered that,
 German politics are too complicated, German political parties too numer-
 ous, and perhaps too hopelessly at variance, to be able always to weigh
 a great economic question fairly on its merits. In any case the trial
 has been too short to entitle either the party of repeal or the party of
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 continuance to an absolute verdict; where neither has as yet made out
 its case, it is the reformer who must intervene.
 JANET E. HIOGARTH
 THE HUNGARIAN ZONE-SYSTEM
 ENGLISH economists have rarely paid much attention to the
 economics of railways. Parliament has failed in the most signal
 manner to cope with the intricacies of railway rates, and railway
 experts do not deign to explain or defend their practice by theoretical
 considerations. It is therefore very interesting to find a theoretical
 investigation of the uses of railways, and it is refreshing to be assured
 by a Hungarian that the zone tariff can be justified on purely
 theoretical -grounds.
 In a pamphlet entitled Der genieinschaftliche Nutzen der Eisenbahnen,
 Herr Bela Ambrozovics begins by considering a place from which
 roads radiate in all directions, and finds that the work done in dis-
 tributing in tons of goods equally over the area of a circle whose
 radius is r and whose centre is the spot considered, is the same as
 that of carrying m tons a distance 3 r. He then considers the effect
 of a railway passing through the starting-point which can carry 1 ton
 n miles for the same price that 1 ton can be carried 1 mile on a
 road. He then finds that the locus of all points to which a given
 number of tons can be carried for a certain price by rail and road
 combined is a rhombus whose greater diameter is in the direction of
 the railway and which is n times as long as the other diameter. We
 find therefore that where formerly a circle whose area is wrr2 was the
 space within which goods could be carried for a price not exceeding a
 certain sum; now (the railway having been made) goods can be carried
 to any point on the boundary of a rhombus whose area is 2nr2 for the
 same sum, so that the area of commercial intercourse (Verkehrs-
 fFiiche) is increased in the ratio 2n: wr by the making of a railway.'
 It is for those well acquainted with the economics of transport to
 say whether these geometrical considerations and the further deduc-
 tions that can be drawn from them are likely to be useful or to have
 any relation to actual facts ; but it must be confessed that several
 assumptions are made which are by no means prima factie true. But,
 however that may be, as soon as Herr Ambrozovics proceeds to consider
 questions of utility, most of his work is vitiated by the fact that he,
 like Cournot in his later chapters, does not pay sufficient attention to
 consumer's rent.
 In a later pamphlet on the zone tariff in relation to his theory
 Herr Ambrozovics points out the interesting consilience between his
 theory and the Hungarian zone tariff. He lays down from theoretical
 1 This is not strictly true, but is approximately so when it is large.
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